# FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS/CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

FMEA\_NUMBER: EC-PORT3-02A

ORIGINATOR: JSC

PROJECT:EDFT-03

PART NUMBER: SED39126473-301 LSC CONTROL NO: N/A

ZONE/LOCATION:PORT 3 & 4

PART NAME: TRACK ANGLE LATCH LRU/ORU PART NUMBER:SED39126409-301 LRU/ORU PART NAME:RIG UMB ASSY/TRAN PLATE SYSTEM: GFE DRAWING/REF DESIGNATOR:SEE P/N

QUANTITY: 1 SUBSYSTEM: EVA

EFFECTIVITY/AFFECT STAGE: STS-72 CRITICALITY:

CRITICAL ITEM: Yes

CRITICALITY CATEGORY: 1R/2

SUCCESS PATHS: 2

SUCCESS PATH REMAINING: 1

END ITEM NAME: N/A

END ITEM FUNCTIONAL: N/A END ITEM CAPABILITY: N/A

END ITEM FAILURE TOLERANCE: N/A

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

A/1. C/O PRELAUNCH: Pass C/O ON ORBIT: N/A for NSTS B/3. DETECTION FLIGHT CREW: Pass 4. DETECTION GROUND CREW: N/A

C/5. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FROM SINGLE CAUSE: Pass

FUNCTION: The RU Track Angle Assembly Latch is used to secure the RU to the transition plate. The latch consists of a captured EVA bolt, two hinge looks (which prevent the bolt from backing out), and a ball detent (preventing rotation of the bolts until a overriding torque is applied to bolt). The hinge locks are freed when a socket is inserted on the bolt.

FAILURE MODE CODE: N/A for NSTS

FAILURE MODE: 1) Unable to fully close a track angle latch 2) Hinge lock open.

CAUSE: galling, contamination.

REMAINING PATHS: 1

remove RU from FSE and jettison.

EFFECT/ MISSION PHASE: EVA, landing

CORRECTIVE ACTION: jettison RU

-FAILURE EFFECTS-

END ITEM/LRU/ORU/ASSEMBLY: Unable to secure RU following EVA operations

SUBSYSTEM/NEXT ASSEMBLY/INTERFACE: N/A

SYSTEM/END ITEM/MISSION: None

CREW/VEHICLE: RU may become free in PLB and damage vehicle if latch opens.

# FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS/CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

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PROJECT/EDFT-03

PART NUMBER: SED39126473-301

LSC CONTROL NO: N/A ZONE/LOCATION:PORT 3 & 4

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QUANTITY: 1 SUBSYSTEM: EVA

EFFECTIVITY/AFFECT STAGE: STS-72

# HAZARD INFORMATION:

HAZARD: N/A

HAZARD ORGANIZATION CODE: N/A

HAZARD NUMBER: N/A

TIME TO EFFECT: Hours TIME TO DETECT: Seconds TIME TO CORRECT: Minutes

FAILURE DETECTION/FLIGHT Visual hinge lock will not be closed

REMARKS:

### -RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTABILITY-

(A) DESIGN: Track Angle latch design incorporates two hinge locks either one of which can prevent the EVA captive bolt from backing out and a ball detent to prevent bolt rotation. The latch EVA bolt on the hay 4 FSE is not required to be screwed into a mating part of the RU for stowage of the RU. Instead structural integrity is achieved by a forced fit of the bottom of the bolt against an load bearing area on the RU. This traps the RU into the bay 4 track angle in all directions. The other track angles securing the RU are allowed to be free in the x direction.

### (B) TEST:

Acceptance: Functional (performed at predelivery acceptance, preinstallation acceptance, pre/post environmental test, and demonstrated during the Thermal Vacuum test.

- 1) Torque required to tighten or loosen the track angle latch bolts is between 200 and 260 in-lb.
- 2) Hinge locks verified to remain in position during all environmental tests and verified to swing at the time of socket insertion or removal.

Acceptance vibration test performed on the flight RU was performed to the following levels for a duration of 1 minute per axis:

X.Y.Z AXI\$

20 Hz 20 - 80Hz .01g2/Hz

+3 db/oct

80 - 350 Hz 350 - 2000 Hz .040g<sup>2</sup>/Hz -3dh/oct

2000 Hz

 $.007g^{2}/Hz$ 

6.1 grms

Acceptance Thermal/Vacuum tost performed at a temperature of -100°F and pressure of 1x10.5 torr at Human thermal/vacoum test.

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PART NAME: TRACK ANGLE LATCH | LRU/ORU PART NUMBER:SED39126409-301

PART NUMBER: SED39126473-301 LSC CONTROL NO: N/A

LRU/ORU PART NAMÉ:RIG UMB ASSY/TRAN PLATE SYSTEM: GFE DRAWING/REF DESIGNATOR:SEE P/N

QUANTITY: 1

ZONE/LOCATION:PORT 3 & 4

EFFECTIVITY/AFFECT STAGE: STS-72

SUBSYSTEM: EVA

#### Oualification:

Qualification for Acceptance Vibration was performed to the following levels for a duration of 2 minutes per axis:

20 Hz 20 - 80Hz .017g2/Hz

80 - 350 Hz

+3 db/oct  $.0670g^{2}/Hz$ 

350 - 2000 Hz

-3db/oct

2000 Hz

 $.012g^{2}/H_{2}$ 

7.87 grms

Qualification Vibration: A vibration test was performed to the following levels for a duration of I minute in each axis: Each redundant path was verified on the track angle assy, latch during x-axis vibration test (x axis was the only axis where anomalies from an earlier test occurred on earlier design of the latch.)

X AXIS		Y AXIS		Ž AXIS	
20 - 32 Hz	.003g2/Hz	20 - 45 Hz	+10 db/oct	20 - 45Hz	.009g <sup>2</sup> /Hz
20 - 32 Hz	+3 db/oct	45 - 600 Hz	$.060g^2/H_2$	45 -70 Hz	+12 db/oct
80 - 350 Hz	.040g <sup>2</sup> /Hz	600 - 2000	-10db/oci	70 - 600 Hz	$.050 \text{ g}^2/\text{Hz}$
350 - 2000 Hz	-3db/oct			600 - 2000Hz	
6.1 grms		7.7 grms		7.0 gcms	

# (C) INSPECTION:

Fabrication - All latch components are verified to generally clean individually. The RU and RU FSE is verified to be visually clean at prodelivery acceptance.

Test - Quality Assurance surveillance is required at all test and inspections. Discrepancy reports are written on all noncompliances.

(D) FAILURE HISTORY: None for this failure mode, the bolt did back out during x axis vibration testing on a earlier version of the track angle latch. Hinge locks were modified and a ball detent added on all of the RU and track angle latches to correct this anomaly. Modified design passed 2nd series of vibration tests.

### (E) OPERATIONAL USE:

- 1) Operational Effect -Track Angle Assy, latch may not close. Hinge locks not in correct position, Release of the RU is possible during deorbit/handing if double failure occurs. Loose equipment could impact the vehicle.
- 2) Crew Action If latch cannot be closed, remove RU from FSE and jettison.
- 3) Crew Training Crew trained in proper operation of track angle latch.
- 4) Mission constraint None.
- 5) In Flight Checkout Proper stowage verified during EVA operations. Bolt turns are counted and the hinge locks visually verified to be in position.

#### (F) MAINTAINABILITY: N/A

PREPARED BY: G. Wright

REVISION:

DATE: 8/10/95

WAIVER NUMBER: